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Abstract
Exploiting a novel data set of criminal trials in 19th century London, we evaluate the impact of an
accused’s right to counsel on convictions. While lower-level crimes had an established history of professional representation prior to 1836, individuals accused of committing a felony did not, even though
the prosecution was conducted by professional attorneys. The Prisoners’ Counsel At of 1836 remedied
this and first introduced the right to counsel in common law systems. Using a difference-in-difference
estimation strategy we identify the causal effect of defense counsel. We find the surprising result that
the professionalization of the courtroom lead to an increase in the conviction rate, which we interpret as
a consequence of jurors feeling that the trial became fairer. We go further and employ a topic modeling
approach to the text of the transcripts to provide suggestive evidence on how the trials changed when
defense counsel was fully introduced.
Keywords: defense counsel; Latent Dirichlet Allocation; Old Bailey; prosecution; right to counsel; text
analysis
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Introduction

The ability of the criminal justice system to provide effective outcomes is a central policy issue today. We
want an institution that deters crime, is responsible with the public’s resources, recognizes the consequences
to both the victim and the accused, mitigates errors, and is applied equally to all. Among the many
institutional features of concern is the quality of the defendant’s legal representation. In the United States,
the right to defense counsel is included explicitly in the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and the
landmark Supreme Court case of Gideon v Wainright (1963) extended this protection to the requirement
that defense counsel be publicly provided to those lacking financial resources. The right to counsel was
incorporated into the Napoleonic Code in 1808 (Zacharis, 2008). Civil law countries have included it since.
The U.K. introduced the right first in 1836 and adopted a publicly-funded legal aid society in 1949.1 A
growing literature questions the quality of the publicly-provided defense in the U.S.2 Since all have access
∗ Corresponding author: Department of Economics, John Chambers College of Business and Economics, 1601 University
Avenue, Morgantown WV 26506, bryan.c.mccannon@gmail.com. We thank Adam Nowak for discussions on text analysis
methods, along with Anna Bindler and Toke Aidt for conversations about the Old Bailey and 19th Century English institutions.
† Department of Economics, John Chambers College of Business and Economics, 1601 University Avenue, Morgantown WV
26506, zjp00003@mix.wvu.edu
1 It was established in the Legal Aid and Advice Act of 1949. It replaced the Poor Prisoners Defence Act of 1930, which was
more limited in scope.
2 We do not know of any empirical investigations into defense counsel in other countries or legal systems.

1

to defense counsel, these investigations can only evaluate how outcomes differ as relevant factors, such as
compensation, vary. They are unable to identify the full consequence of having a right to defense counsel as
they do not observe outcomes arising without this right.
To evaluate the impact of defensive legal representation, we leverage a unique data set only recently
digitized and made public − the criminal trials at the Old Bailey in London. The Old Bailey served as the
central courthouse for the prosecution of crimes in London during the 1700s and 1800s. This is an important
period for the development of common law as institutional features that exist in common law countries today
were invented there and then.
Prior to this period, the accused stood trial before a judge and jury without any legal counsel. The
Prisoners’ Counsel Act, passed by Parliament in 1836, introduced the right to counsel for felony cases.
Ironically (to the modern observer), misdemeanor cases had an established history of being allowed the use of
defense counsel. Many misdemeanor crimes involved business interests with civil implications. Consequently,
misdemeanor prosecution had evolved to allow business owners to hire legal counsel in these cases. Those
accused of committing felony crimes did not have this right. This legal environment provides the opportunity
to estimate a difference-in-difference specification to identify the causal effect that the introduction of a right
to counsel had on criminal trials.
This is what we do. We document a counter-intuitive outcome. Felony crimes, relative to misdemeanors,
experience an escalation in the conviction rate once the defendant has the full right to defensive counsel.
While potentially surprising, we view our result as being in line with Bindler and Hjalmarsson (2018a)
who also study convictions at the Old Bailey. They document an increase in the conviction rate when the
severity of the sanction imposed is reduced. They interpret their result as evidence that jurors respond
to the harshness of the punishment. When a conviction results in the death penalty, as was common
in the 1700s, jurors are unwilling to convict. We extend this logic to the lop-sided trials prior to 1836.
Prosecution could use legal professionals, but the defendant could not. Our results suggest that in an
“unfair” institutional arrangement such as this, jurors are again hesitant to convict. Once the criminal trial
became professionalized, English jurors felt free to convict, on the margin. We show that this effect arises
regardless of the sanction’s harshness. Further, the effect is similar for both cases that utilize defense counsel
and for those defendants who opt not to hire representation. Thus, the change represents a shift to the legal
institution’s functioning.
We go further and evaluate the text of the trial transcripts. First, using a dictionary method approach, we
identify which cases likely involved defense counsel and show that four crimes in particular experienced large
increases after the Act’s implementation: fraud, pickpocketing, theft, and animal theft. Evaluating each
subset of thousands of trial transcripts, we next employ a popular topic modeling method, Latent Dirichlet
Allocation, to uncover hidden themes in the trials. We find that answers related to the exact timing of
events exhibit a noticeable increase in prevalence after 1836. This suggests that professional representation
improved the testimony’s exactness.
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We are not the first to study trials at the Old Bailey. Bindler and Hjalmarrson (2017; 2018a; 2019; 2020;
2021) provide a series of analyses utilizing the data created by the Old Bailey project. Our main result uses
the same data set as Bindler and Hjalmarrson (2018a). There, as stated previously, the authors examine
the effect that punishment severity has on jury verdicts. They use a difference-in-difference method to link
reductions in punishment severity with increases in conviction rates. The authors made use of the halt in
penal transportation during the American Revolutionary War and the offense-specific abolition of capital
punishment as natural experiments.
Bindler and Hjalmarrson (2017) examines trends in age amongst those convicted at the Old Bailey.
Their findings are in line with the bulk of criminology literature in that the largest share of those convicted
were in their 20s. Bindler and Hjalmarrson (2019) examine path dependency amongst jury verdicts. In these
proceedings, juries would hear and decide on several cases in the same session. The authors examine whether
the decision made by a jury on one case affected their decisions on subsequent cases heard in that session.
The authors find a positive correlation between the previous verdict and that jury’s subsequent decisions.
Bindler and Hjalmarsson (2020) ask whether the gender disparity in sentencing observed in modern data
(Starr, 2015) has been a consistent phenomenon. They show that it has. Hence, demographics of the accused
matter.
Finally, in their most recent work, Bindler and Hjalmarrson (2021) make use of the Old Bailey proceedings
to examine how the development of the London Metropolitan Police Force, the world’s first professional police
force, impacted crime rates. This was done by manually geocoding locations into treated and untreated areas
from the transcripts and from daily police reports. Using this data, the 1829 Metropolitan Police Act serves
as a natural experiment to ask whether the development of a professional police force deterred crime. They
find significant reductions in violent crimes with a particularly large reduction in burglaries.3
Legal historians have also studied trials at the Old Bailey. Our historical background provided in the next
section relies heavily on archival work by May (2003). Legal historians have labeled the Prisoners’ Counsel
Act of 1836 as “arguably the most significant development in criminal trial procedure during the nineteenth
century” (Griffiths, 2014, p.28). The Act has been credited with taking an important step towards the
creation of the adversarial court system and that the “cut-and-thrust nature of adversarial procedure in turn
gave rise to many features of the ordinary trial that we now take for granted” (Gallanis, 2006, p.163).
As mentioned, work on the modern U.S. legal system has primarily explored the contrasting outcomes
generated by different types of defense counsel. For example, Roach (2014) identifies gaps between outcomes
achieved by salaried, full-time public defenders and court-appointed attorneys who receive a fee for each case
handled. Abrams and Yoon (2007) look within a public defender office and show that attorney experience
correlates strongly with case outcomes. Roach (2017) considers a case study of New York state increasing
assigned counsel’s hourly rate and shows that the effect interacts with the underlying poverty rate of the
district they work in. Agan, Freedman, and Owens (2021) are able to compare case outcomes achieved by
3 Similar

to this, Voth (1998) uses references to employment as a measurement of time use by laborers.
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attorneys working as court-appointed attorneys, for relatively low fee, to those achieved by the same attorneys
when working privately for defendants. While a substantial amount of the discrepancy in outcomes is due to
case selection, much is left to differences in un-measurable effort exertion. Shem-Tov (2021) exploits within
case variation of co-defendants whose cases are handled by different attorneys. He shows that defendants
represented by public defenders obtain more favorable outcomes than court-appointed attorneys. Differences
between defense attorneys in experience and compensation are important, but they cannot measure the
impact that the right to counsel has on outcomes.
Our work also connects to the Bayesian jury literature which explores the consequences of the jury
collecting information, updating their beliefs, and making conviction decisions to maximize their objective
functions. The theme in these papers is that the information created by the criminal justice institutions
will affect their willingness to convict, which will cycle back and affect decisions made by other legal actors.
For example, Friedman and Wickelgren (2006) evaluate how juror’s imperfect information creates a lower
bound on the amount of deterrence that can be achieved even when the potential sanction is unbounded.
Bjerk (2007) illustrates how juror updating of beliefs frustrates the ability of plea bargaining to fully screen
the innocent from the guilty. Relatedly, theoretical models of jury voting highlight the impact of unanimous
voting rules on the ability of the jury to reach the correct verdict (Feddersen and Pesendorfer, 1998; Duggan
and Martinelli, 2001). Coupled with recent documentation that gender (Hoekstra and Street, 2021) and
racial (Flanagan, 2018) composition of the jury matters, our result points to the importance of juror’s
preferences and incentives in understanding legal outcomes.
We execute our analysis of the right to counsel in a series of steps. First, in Section 2 we provide a
brief historical background of criminal prosecution in London and describe the specifics of the institutional
change. In Section 3 we examine the trial transcripts for evidence of increases in defense counsel presence
and the validity of our identification strategy. The data is described in Section 4. Section 5 presents our
main result. In Section 6 we dig into the transcripts of the trial and apply topic modeling methods to provide
suggestive evidence of how the professionalization of the trials affected the courtroom.

2
2.1

Historical Background
Criminal Prosecution in London

The criminal justice system of 18th century England was largely characterized by penalties much harsher
than those doled out today. A complex and non-centralized system of statutes, acts, and decrees established
sentencing guidelines for most offense categories. At the start of the 18th century, more than 200 crimes
were punishable by execution (Bindler and Hjalmarsson, 2018a; Wade, 2009). The 18th century saw gradual
reform in this “Bloody Code”, with less serious offenses (such as pickpocketing for instance) no longer treated
as capital crimes. The era’s distinction between misdemeanor and felony was often blurred. The four Offense
Against a Person Acts of 1828, 1837, 1861, and 1875 provide some degree of the formalization to the criminal
code (England and Wales Law Commission, 2009).
4

Those accused of crimes in London would have their cases heard in either the Old Bailey or at a lower
magisterial court. Felony charges, as well as more serious misdemeanors, were tried at the Old Bailey’s
higher courts. Each session at the Old Bailey would consist of a series of cases tried before the same judge
and that session’s juries.4 Every case would be heard in front of a jury particular to the crime’s location,
either the city of London or Middlesex County (Cockburn and Green, 1988). Contemporaneous writings
estimate that the average trial “never ... exceeded eight and a half minutes” (Wontner, 1833).
The accused would often find him/herself jailed in Newgate Prison; a prison originally built in the 12th
century out of a gate of the ancient Roman London Wall. The Old Bailey courthouse was built connected to
this prison, allowing for the quick movement of prisoners between confinement, trial, and execution (Halliday,
2007). Conditions inside the prison are recorded as being particularly harsh. Those sentenced to death spent
their final days chained and shackled underground in open sewer dungeons. The remaining prisoners lived
under the control of gaolers: Private administrators hired by the sheriffs managed the prison. Poor hygiene
and medical care allowed illness to run rampant through the prison. Dozens of inmates died annually due
to the poor conditions of confinement (Halliday, 2007).

2.2

Proceedings

Since the 17th century the actions of notorious criminals were commonly published and enjoyed by the people
of England. In January 1679 the Court of Alderman for London ordered that accounts of the proceedings at
the Old Bailey can only be published with approval of the Lord Mayor. This acted to monopolize the market
into an annual publication known as the Old Bailey Proceedings. In 1787 publication became subsidized and
copies of the Proceedings were made for public officials. The use of it as an official record of criminal trials
in the city of London and Middlesex County continued until the early 1900s.5 The digitization and posting
of the Proceedings was made possible through recent funding from Arts and Humanities Research Council
and the Economic and Social Research Council affiliated with the British government.
The Proceedings provide a unique opportunity to explore the testimony, questioning, and rulings at the
Old Bailey. Entries include the identify of the judge and accused, provide a transcript of the testimony given
at trial, and present the ruling and sentence (if applicable). We will use data taken from these transcripts
in our analysis.

2.3

Defense Counsel Prior to 1836

Prior to the 18th century the administration of criminal justice in London can be categorized as “straining
a system designed for rural communities rather than metropolitan conurbation” (May, 2003, p.14). Those
4 Juries were made up solely of wealthy men, with the Juries Act of 1825 requiring that all jurors own property and be
between the ages of 21 and 60. Magisterial courts handled the least-serious offenses. Each session of the court would begin with
the assembling of two separate twelve-man juries; one composed of men from London and the other composed of men from
greater Middlesex County. Positions as judges were primarily awarded to wealthy and educated men, either as acknowledgment
of their legal expertise or as a reward for political favors (Cockburn and Green, 1988). See Hanly (2021) for a further discussion
of jury selection procedures.
5 See oldbaileyonline.org and Shoemaker (2008) for historical accounts.
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harmed by the crime prosecuted their cases directly, and those accused of committing crimes were forced to
defend themselves. As discussed by Bindler and Hjalmarsson (2018a), the most serious crimes came with
the possibility of capital punishment. One could gain the “benefit of clergy” or a royal pardon to avoid this
harsh punishment. May (2003) summarizes the administration of criminal justice in the eighteenth century
as being “underpinned by the dual premises of terror and mercy” (p.13).
In the 18th century, attorneys, known as solicitors, were introduced to prosecute criminal cases. The
professionalization of prosecution was driven initially by government agencies defending the state’s interest.
For example, the Royal Mint, Treasury, and Bank of England were able to use professional solicitors to
prosecute counterfeiting and coinage violations. Consequently, an industry of trained solicitors arose to
prosecute crimes. In addition, the city of London created a City Solicitor position to represent the city in
criminal prosecutions. See Koyama (2012) for a detailed discussion of private prosecution services during
this period of time.
Those accused of committing a felony crime, though, were prohibited from having attorneys represent
them at trial. It was a common viewpoint that the criminal trial’s objective was a search for the truth and
that defense counsel would simply act to distort the truth. The dominant belief was that the judge offered
the best protection of the prisoner’s rights during a trial (May, 2003). Defendants should be motivated to
tell the truth and did not have need for counsel.
Ironically, while felony crimes prohibited professional representation, misdemeanor crimes had developed
a tradition of having professional solicitors provide defense services. Often misdemeanor crimes were closely
connected with civil harms, such as fraud or forgery. Consequently, businesses were often connected with
the defense and business owners hired professional attorneys to represent their interests.6 May (2003) argues
that the introduction of lawyers first arose to help businesses prepare their defense in these more minor cases.
Thus, leading into the 19th century, the felony courtroom in London was a rather lop-sided undertaking. An experienced judge and a jury of affluent property owners determined guilt and sentencing. The
prosecution of the crime was conducted by a professional attorney, yet the defendant was alone to defend
him/herself in the courtroom.7

2.4

Prisoners’ Counsel Act of 1836

Prior to 1836, the courthouses of England were not entirely absent defense counsel. At the discretion
of judges, a solicitor could be used to perform a cross-examination of witnesses on behalf of the accused
(Langbein, 1978). Similarly, defense counsel could address the court on issues of the law, again, if allowed by
6 Treason

cases also allowed for defense counsel, but no such case arises in the Proceedings during the time period we study.
an illustration, a popular publication at the time, intended to be a guidebook, encouraged prosecuting counsel that
they “ought to confine himself to a simple detail of the facts he expects to prove, because the prisoner has no opportunity of
laying his case before the jury by his counsel; and even the privilege of stating circumstances, however dryly, in such order and
direction as may tend most directly to a particular conclusion is, of itself, no small advantage accorded to the prosecutor, and
certainly should be exercised with great forbearance and caution ... In cases of misdemeanour, the prosecuting counsel is not
thus restricted, because here the defendant is allowed to make a real defence by his counsel and, therefore, here the counsel for
the prosecutor may not only state his facts, but reason upon them, and anticipate any line of defence which his opponent may
probably adopt” (Dickenson and Talfourd, 1929).
7 As
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the judge (Beattie, 1991). These two privileges do not seem to be frequently awarded or taken advantage of.
Importantly, prior to 1836, counsel representing the accused was unable to address the jury, which included
the inability to make opening or closing speeches.
While defense counsel’s contribution to the trial was limited, case preparation was still possible prior
to the trial (Langbein, 1999). However, defense counsel could not gain access to defendants detained at
Newgate. In fact, neither the defendant nor a solicitor even had the right to a copy of either the formal
charges or the depositions taken.8 When a connection between a defendant and a solicitor was made prior to
the trial, the solicitor’s actions tended to be restricted to helping the defendant author a written statement
which s/he could then read aloud at court. In the rare circumstances where solicitors were employed, they
were only done so in the moments immediately before the trial and were typically only then informed of the
charges levied and the evidence present (May, 2003). The inability of a solicitor to defend the accused to
the jury or to prepare a defense prior to the trial date, coupled with the not-insignificant fees charged, led
to there being little incentive for defendants to hire professional help in felony cases.
Reformers worked to remedy this deficiency. Attempts to pass an act through Parliament granting a full
right to counsel failed several times during the early 19th century (Bentley, 2003).9 Proponents of this sort
of reform argued that it was not logical that a defendant be “allowed counsel to defend him for a twopenny
trespass but denied the like privilege where his life was at stake” (Bentley, 2003). Legal periodical press at
the time referred to the Act as promoting “fair-play speech” referring to the fact that prior to the 1836 only
the prosecution could have a legal professional speak to the jury on the matter. The question at hand was
whether professional advocates would promote the search for truth. Summarizing the opposition, Serjeant
Spankie commented during the Parliamentary debates that
it appears to me ... the effect of allowing counsel in felonies would totally destroy the temper,
moderation, and sobriety of the administration of criminal justice. The counsel for the prosecution
would follow the bad example of the counsel for the prisoner. In a public contest the strict
discharge of duty would yield to the fame of eloquence and the ardour of victory; the authority
of the judge would be despised; the jury would be exposed to the corruptions of the worst arts
of the forum (Grant, 1838).10
Thus, it was uncertain to policymakers at the time whether rectifying the lop-sided nature of felony trials
by providing a right to counsel would promote the truth or aid the guilty’s escape from punishment. In fact,
some parliamentarians suggested eliminating the use of professional attorneys for the prosecution. Thomas
Wontner, writing on developments in the courts and law in Great Britain in 1832, reports that an honorable
member of parliament would be willing to join a bill that would “take away the privilege of counsel from
8 May (2003) explains that professional etiquette prohibited a solicitor from entering the gaol. Thus, there would not be a
chance to interview a client.
9 This time period, more generally, was one of many reforms to political, as well as legal, reforms. See, as an example, Aidt
and Franck’s (2015) analysis of revolutionary riots and extensions of the franchise in the early 1830s.
10 Stated more succinctly, James Harmer testified that “the generality of profession are of opinion that counsel ought not to
be allowed to speak for a prisoner, and that the practice would be injurious to the accused” (quoted in Wood (2003)).
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the prosecutor, so that both parties may be placed on equal footing” (Wontner, 1833, p.322). Another
parliamentarian opposed efforts to provide a right to counsel arguing that it would “lead to a trial of skill
and the prosecutor, being the richer party, would generally succeed” (p.323). Wontner himself argues against
such logic stating that a “ridiculous fiction is resorted to of the judge being counsel for the prisoner” (p.324).
Clearly, political leaders in Great Britain at the time recognized the unfair, lop-sided nature of felony criminal
trials and debated the best institutional change.
Finally, in 1836 Parliament passed the Prisoners’ Counsel Act (hereafter Act). The Act changed the
dynamic of the criminal trial in England by allowing all defendants accused of a felony the right to make full
Answer and Defence thereto, by Counsel learned in the Law (Beattie, 1991). In practice, this act extended
the right to a defense counsel from misdemeanor offenses to all accused. The Act solidified the defense
counsel’s involvement in felony cases, taking the final step in allowing defense counsel to directly and fully
address the jury (Langbein, 1983). Being able to address the jury meant that defense counsel was now able
to directly question and debate the veracity of the evidence presented against their client (Langbein, 1999).
Still, despite the Act granting this right to all accused, many defendants still represented themselves at
trial due to an inability to pay for private representation. Bentley (2003) points out that at the turn of the
20th century, more than sixty years after the Act’s implementation, defendants represented by counsel were
still a minority. The end of the 19th century saw numerous attempts to address this issue. Eventually, in
1903 the Poor Prisoner’s Act was passed allowing prisoners to plead in forma pauperis and to be assigned
counsel by the court (Bentley, 2003).
Our identification strategy relies on a control group of crime types that previously had access to defense
counsel prior to the Act’s implementation. Legal historians assert that a comprehensive, well-articulated
criminal code did not exist in the common law structure of 19th century London (Wade, 2009). “Misdemeanor” crimes were allowed to have defense counsel, but the delineation of which crimes this includes is
not clear. The most minor offenses were handled by magisterial courts. Some crimes one would normally
associate with misdemeanor offenses, such as libel, are prosecuted at the Old Bailey. For the purpose of
this study, we define our control group of less-severe crimes using two lists. First, from the Offence Against
Persons Act we use a list of crimes clearly articulated there as misdemeanors. Any crime type on this list
that also arises at the Old Bailey is treated as a control crime. Second, as stated previously, over 200 crimes
came with the possibility of a death sentence during the Bloody Code of the 18th century. Very few crimes
escaped this severe sanction. Any crime that at no point in the 1700s or 1800s had the possibility of capital
punishment is also included in our control group. The treated crimes, then, are those previously subject to
the Bloody Code and were not those formally defined as misdemeanors.

3

Evidence of Defense Counsel at the Old Bailey

The Act, as stated, provided a greater role for defense attorneys in felony criminal cases in London. By
being able to be involved in the case before trial and being able to directly question witnesses and address
8

the jury, defense counsel presumably provides more value to the accused. Recognizing many defendants will
lack resources, hiring a defense attorney comes at a significant opportunity cost. Thus, not all defendants
will pay for the service. At the margin, then, we would expect more to be hired. We look to the transcripts
from the trials at the Old Bailey to verify that we indeed see an increase in the prevalence of defense counsel.
To do this, we first scrape all transcripts from criminal trials at the Old Bailey using the online portal,
The Proceedings of the Old Bailey.11 We focus on the 80-year period centered on 1836. The transcripts are
formatted into a question-then-answer format. Each question and corresponding answer is separated into
distinct paragraphs. The identity of the questioner is typically noted. For example, if a question comes from
the judge, the question will start with “Judge Q: ...”. The attorney for the prosecution, the defense counsel
(if present), the judge, and even members of the jury can ask questions.
When a question is asked by a defense attorney to a prosecutor’s witness, the question is recorded as
“Cross-examine: ...”. We search the text of each case for the presence of the phrase “cross examine” (with
punctuation and capitalization eliminated) and different tenses (i.e., “cross examined”). Further, we add
searches for “solicitor”. An indicator variable is created if any of these terms exists in the text.
We take this indicator variable as our measurement of the presence of defense counsel. We emphasize,
though, that this measurement is not perfectly precise. The court recorder may fail to identify a defense
attorney when one is hired.12 A question may not be assigned an author or a transcript can be incomplete.13
Thus, our measure should be thought of as a lower bound to the actual prevalence of a defense attorney.14
Further, this measurement does not account for the new, important activities allowed by the Act; namely
the ability to directly address the jury and have access to charging information, witnesses, and the accused
prior to trial. Nevertheless, it should measure fairly well changes in the prevalence of defense counsel at the
Old Bailey. Figure 1 compares the proportion of cases that record the existence of defense counsel before
and after the 1836 Act.
Prior to the Act’s implementation (the light gray bars), the less-serious crimes had a substantially higher
rate of having defense counsel presence, as measured by the keyword search of the trial transcripts. Control
crimes come with substantially less severe punishments, so the incentive to hire a costly attorney is lower,
ceteris paribus. The fact that they have (measurable) representation at almost a 50% higher rate confirms
that solicitor’s value was restricted in felony cases. The growth in the use of defense counsel is substantial
for the treated crimes, while only a negligible change arises for the control crimes (dark gray bars).
Figure 1 shows that defense counsel grows in prevalence for felony crimes, overall, but not for the lessserious crimes. This is evidence in line with our argument that the less-serious crimes can be used as an
11 www.oldbaileyonline.org
12 Recognizing the Proceedings’s initial target audience, legal details that may have been of less interest to the general
population were often omitted (Gallanis, 2006). This could very well include recognizing the defense counsel.
13 To this point, Langbein (1983) compares a judge’s personal notes to the official record of the Old Bailey Session Papers
and found seven instances of the failure to note counsel’s presence. There exists a general consensus that the Session Papers
under-report the frequency of counsel for both the defense and prosecution (Beattie, 1991).
14 It is also conceivably possible that a defendant brings his/her own witnesses that are cross-examined by the prosecutor’s
attorney. While typically the name of the attorney representing the prosecutor is used for each question, it could occasionally
be the case that the cross-examination noted is done by a prosecutor.
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Figure 1: Use of Defense Counsel Before and After the 1836 Act
40
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Each column depicts the proportion of observations where a defense counsel is present in the transcript of the trial. The left
two columns are for our set of treated crimes and the right two columns are for the control crimes. The light gray columns
are the proportion in the years prior to the Act’s implementation, while the dark gray columns are for the years where the
Act is in place. The 95% confidence intervals are depicted.

un-treated, control group. Thus, a difference-in-difference estimation strategy will be used to obtain a causal
estimate of the impact of defense counsel on trial outcomes.

4

Data

Our primary data source is the quantification of the records of the Old Bailey. Specifically, we start with the
same data set as used in Bindler and Hjalmarsson (2018a).15 Basic information is recorded for each criminal
case between 1715 and 1900. The data set is at the offender level. That is, a defendant may have more than
one charge levied against him/her in an observation in the data set. If two or more individuals are accused
of committing a crime together, each defendant is a separate observation. There are 265,662 observations in
the full data set.
For each, the crime the defendant is charged with, whether s/he is convicted, and (if convicted) the
sentence imposed is recorded. Basic demographic information such as the defendant’s gender and age are
provided. The Old Bailey handled criminal cases arising in the city of London as well as Middlesex County.
This distinction is measured when available. Basic descriptive statistics are provided in Table 1.
We use indicator variables to record when a trial transcript does not provide information on age, gender,
or jury identity. Gender has almost full reporting with just less than 80% of the defendants being male. Since
Bindler and Hjalmarsson (2017) show the changing age profile at the Old Bailey and Bindler and Hjalmarsson
(2020) highlight gender disparities, it will be important to include these controls in our estimations. In our
15 This data is made available on the AEJ’s website (Bindler and Hjalmarsson, 2018b). We greatly appreciate these authors
making the data available.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics

Control
Age less than 18
Age missing
Male defendant
Gender missing
Number of defendants
London jury
Middlesex jury

Mean
0.1277
0.2347
0.7953
0.0024
1.463
0.0482
0.1890

The baseline time period (1796 to 1876) is considered here; N = 136, 144. The omitted group for the jury composition
is unknown compositions (i.e., missing). All variables are binary except the number of defendants. For it, the standard
deviation is 1.366 with a median of 1 and maximum value of 35. Of the 333 observations with gender missing, 82 are also
missing the age.

Figure 2: Conviction Rate over Time

time frame, 69.9% of cases have only one defendant and the bulk of the observations do not identify the
jury’s identify (≈ 75%). London went through numerous changes between 1715 and 1900. Institutions,
economic well-being, and cultural identity adjusted. Wars were fought and the Industrial Revolution took
hold. Therefore, we choose in our baseline specification to limit the time range to the forty years before and
the forty years after the Act’s implementation. This mitigates some of the significant structural changes in
the city. We will, of course, assess the sensitivity of our results to the cutoffs. Thus, in our baseline analysis
we consider criminal cases at the Old Bailey between 1796 and 1876. There are 135,365 observations.
Regarding the outcome variable of interest, for the baseline period of 1796 to 1876 (±40 years around
the Act’s implementation), 75.2% of the observations had a conviction. The crime prosecuted falls within
our treated crime types for 89.4% of the observations. Figure 2 provides the time series for the convictions.
We collapse the data so that the figure reports the conviction rate for each year.
The three vertical lines define the time periods used in study. The baseline specifications will, as stated,
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consider crimes between 1796 and 1876. As one can see, the conviction rate grows rapidly during our
selected sample period until the early 1840s (solid line). It is then relatively flat after that. This figure
does not account for the mix of crimes tried at the Old Bailey or the changing demographics of the pool of
defendants. It also illustrates that we must carefully account for the time trend in prosecutions prior to the
Act’s implementation.
In addition, Figure 2 illustrates the number of cases handled at the Old Bailey each year (dashed line).
Similar to the conviction rate, it illustrates a steady increase into the 1840s, but the caseload experiences a
substantial decline reaching its pre-boom level by the 1850s.
By omitting cases heard at the Old Bailey in the 1700s, periods of relative low activity and convictions
are excluded from the analysis. The time period considered focuses on the period of heightened activity
when pressure to dispose of cases (among other concerns) is highest.

5

Difference-in-Difference Results

The primary econometric model to estimate is
Convictionicy = β1 P ostiy × T reatedic + τiy + κic + Xicy β + ϵicy .

(1)

The dependent variable, Convictionicy , as previously described is an indicator variable equal to one if case
i, of crime type c in year y, resulted in a conviction. P ostiy is an indicator variable equal to one if y > 1836,
the year of the Act’s implementation. The indicator T reatedic is equal to one if observation i is a treated
crime type. The indicator variables τiy are a set of year fixed effects, and κic are crime controls. Xicy is a set
of control variables (those provided in Table 1). The coefficient β1 is the difference-in-difference coefficient
of interest. If β1 < 0, then felonies treated with the Act experience a (relative) reduction in the conviction
rate after the Act is passed, while if β1 > 0, then the treated felonies experience an increase in the conviction
rate. Alternatively, if β1 = 0, then the creation of the right to counsel had no effect on trial outcomes.
There are thirty-two crime categories included in the crime fixed effects − nine of which make up the
controls and twenty-three crimes which make up the treated group. Standard errors will be clustered at
the crime by year level. Since sanctions are crime specific but can vary over time as legislation changes
each crime’s punishment severity, we feel that this is the appropriate level for the experiment (Abadie et al.,
2017).

5.1

Parallel Trends

The estimation strategy, summarized in equation (1), can be interpreted as providing a causal identification
of the Act’s impact on convictions at the Old Bailey so long as the treated and control crime types are
following parallel trends prior to the Act’s implementation. If so, then divergence between the two types
of cases after the Act is put into place capture the effect of it on trial outcomes. If the difference in the
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Table 2: Test of (Linear) Pre-Act Parallel Trends

Baseline

Alternative Time Windows

±40 years
[1796-1876]
[1]
0.0048 ***
(0.0013)

±30 years
[1806-1866]
[2]
0.0044 *
(0.0024)

±50 years
[1786-1886]
[3]
0.0040
(0.0009)

BH window
[1803-1871]
[4]
0.0044 **
(0.0019)

Year x Treated

-0.0005
(0.0012)

-0.00003
(0.00236)

0.0004
(0.0010)

0.0002
(0.0018)

Crime Fixed Effects?
R2
AIC
N
# clusters

Yes
0.055
149,514
135,696
81

Yes
0.053
126,621
126,621
61

Yes
0.057
172,145
172,145
98

Yes
0.054
136,502
125,635
69

coverage:
years:
Year (b
α1 )

Dependent variable is equal to one if the case resulted in a conviction. Each specification differs in the time range considered.
Controls include an indicator variable for being over the age of 18, age missing, male, gender missing, trial using a London
jury, and the trial using a Middlesex jury. We include the number of defendants involved in the case. There are 32 crime
indicator variables included. Only α
b1 and α
b2 are reported here, but the full model specified in (2) is estimated. Standard
errors presented in parentheses are clustered at the crime by year level; *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% level of significance.

conviction rates do not change, and the two are on parallel paths, then the Act can be argued to be ineffective
at changing courtroom outcomes.
To provide a test for parallel trends, we consider a linear time trend in the pre-treatment period. Specifically, we estimate
Convictionicy = α1 Y eariy + α2 Y eariy × T reatedic
+ α3 P ostiy × Y eariy + α4 P ostiy × T reatedic × Y earit

(2)

+ α5 P ostiy + α6 P ostiy × T reatedic + κic + ϵicy .
The coefficient α1 captures the linear time trend in convictions for the non-treated crime types and α2
measures whether the treated crimes follow a different time trend in the pre-Act period. Testing whether
α
b2 = 0 is our assessment of parallel trends. The coefficients α3 and α4 allow for the time trends to be distinct
after the Act takes effect. The coefficients α5 and α6 allow for jumps at the Act’s implementation. Table 2
provides the results.
The table assesses parallel trends over various time frames. For each, while there is a slight, gradual
increase in the conviction rate prior to the Act’s implementation, the treated crimes and the untreated
crimes do not follow different time paths. For example, in our baseline specification, [1], the p-value on the
interaction is 0.714. For the most part, the conviction rate for both felonies and the control crimes are flat
over time.16
16 While not presented in Table 2 (since the focus in on the pre-Act time period), the time trend diverges after the Act’s
implementation. A level shift up in the time trend occurs (b
α5 = 8.03; p < 0.01) and the time trend for the treated crimes after
the treatment does not differ from the non-treated crimes (b
α6 has p > 0.6).
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In addition, it is also worthwhile to test for nonlinear discrepancies between the treated and control as
the assumption of linear time trends may be too restrictive. Section 5.3.3 evaluates the dynamic effects of
our main results by breaking up the 40-year window prior to the Act’s implementation into eight pentads
(i.e., five-year groups) and the eight pentads following it. These are each interacted with the treatment
indicator and the set replaces Year x Treated and Post x Year x Treated in equation (2).
The results are presented there and provide additional confirmation of common trends in the pre-Act
periods. Thus, our identification strategy permits causal identification.
Another concern regarding the identification strategy is that the stable unit treatment value assumption
(SUTVA) holds (Rubin, 1978). What is essential is that the treatment on the felony crimes do not spill over
and affect the prosecution of the misdemeanor crimes. SUTVA would be violated if, for example, the jury’s
willingness to convict in the misdemeanors change after defendants in trials for felony crimes receive the
right to have full use of defense counsel. While unable to test directly, this seems unlikely. SUTVA would
also be violated if the legal institution’s change affected either the charging decisions or the population’s
willingness to commit crimes in the first place. If either occurred, then the “control” crimes after the Act’s
implementation would no longer match the “control” crimes prior to the Act so that, as a consequence, the
estimate would no longer serve as a reliable counterfactual and the treatment effect’s estimate would be
biased. Thus, SUTVA would be violated if the mix of cases arising at the Old Bailey changes with the Act’s
implementation. Our supplemental appendix explores the sensitivity of the results to changes in the case
mix and shows that the main result is not driven by case mix.

5.2

Main Result

The primary question we ask here is how did the introduction to the right to counsel influence convictions of
cases at trial. We first partition our data set into those treated crimes and the untreated ones and compare
the mean conviction rate prior to the Act’s implementation to the mean after. Figure 3 depicts them.
Prior to the Act’s implementation, the conviction rate for the two types of crimes were strikingly similar.
While the control crimes experienced a slight increase, the conviction rate jumps up substantially for the
treated crimes. Here, the conviction rate increases by 9.9%. Rather, the net expansion in the conviction
rate was an increase of 3.89 percentage points.
We now turn to the estimation of equation (1) to establish whether the observation in Figure 3 is robust.
Table 3 presents the results.
The first column provides our main result. That treated felonies, relative to the control crimes, experience
an increase in the conviction rate suggests that the right to counsel corresponds to an increase in convictions.
Not only does the statistical significance remain when alternative time periods are considered, but the
magnitude of the difference-in-difference coefficient is stable. It achieves its largest value for the time period
used in Bindler and Hjalmarsson (2018a) of 1803-71; column [4]. Using our baseline specification, [1], at the
mean the conviction rate increases for felonies by 3.0%, which is in line with the observation in Figure 3.
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Figure 3: Convictions Before and After the 1836 Act
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% of cases
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Each column depicts the proportion of observations with a guilty conviction. The left two columns are for our set of treated
crimes and the right two columns are for the misdemeanor crimes (full definition). The light gray columns are the proportion
in the years prior to the Act’s implementation, while the dark gray columns are for the years where the Act is in place.

Table 3: Main Result

Baseline
coverage:
years:
Post x Treated

Crime Fixed Effects?
Year Fixed Effects?
Controls?
R2
AIC
N
# clusters
DV µ

Alternative Time Windows

±40 years
[1796-1876]
[1]
0.0250 ***
(0.0064)

±30 years
[1806-1866]
[2]
0.0239 ***
(0.0063)

±50 years
[1786-1886]
[3]
0.0190 **
(0.0080)

BH window
[1803-1871]
[4]
0.0263 ***
(0.0063)

Yes
Yes
Yes
0.514
59,165
135,365
81
0.7523

Yes
Yes
Yes
0.554
38,097
117,229
61
0.7617

Yes
Yes
Yes
0.458
86,860
153,046
98
0.7440

Yes
Yes
Yes
0.528
48,981
125,315
69
0.7583

Dependent variable is equal to one if the case resulted in a conviction. Each specification differs in the time range considered.
Controls include an indicator variable for being over the age of 18, age missing, male, gender missing, trial using a London
jury, and the trial using a Middlesex jury. We include the number of defendants involved in the case. There are 32 crime
indicator variables included. Standard errors presented in parentheses are clustered at the crime by year level; *** 1%, **
5%, * 10% level of significance.
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5.3

Additional Results

Previous scholarship on criminal trials at the Old Bailey has documented important disparities and institutional changes. We explore whether these differences influence our main result.
5.3.1

London Metropolitan Police

The London Metropolitan Police Force was one of the world’s first professional police forces. It was established initially by the Metropolitan Police Act of 1829, and its range would be expanded by the Metropolitan
Police Act of 1839. Prior to the formation of this professional force, law enforcement was conducted by unpaid appointed constables or by the army itself. The force initially consisted of slightly under 1000 officers
of varying rank, divided into divisions and tasked with patrolling the city’s seventeen newly defined police
territories (Emsley, 1991).17 By many accounts, the police force was initially quite unpopular and constables
were often subject to verbal and physical assault (Emsley, 1991). Nevertheless, this police force patrolled
London, investigated crimes, apprehended known criminals, and brought them forth for criminal proceedings.
Bindler and Hjalmarsson (2021) evaluate the effect of the creation of the police force on crime. In our
analysis, one can be concerned that the cases arising at the Old Bailey may be affected. More thorough
investigations could potentially improve the evidence and lead to more convictions for example. The concern
is that our estimation strategy is simply capturing changes in law enforcement practices rather than defense
counsel.
Since our difference-in-difference estimation strategy includes year fixed effects, which will capture year
by year differences in the caseload, the threat to our identification arises if the effect of the police force differs
between the treated and control crimes.
To address this concern, we create an indicator variable, P oliceiy , which is equal to one if y > 1829,
interact it with the treatment indicator, and add it to equation (1). Table 4 presents the results.
Column [1] only includes the interaction between the introduction of the police force and the treated
crimes. Notably, the coefficient is smaller and statistically insignificant. Column [2] provides better information. Once the introduction of the police force is separated from the introduction of the right to counsel,
contrasting effects arise. Criminal convictions in the decade prior to the Act’s implementation see a decrease
in conviction rates, relative to the untreated control crimes. Once this effect is removed, the magnitude of
the right to counsel’s impact grows. Therefore, not only does the creation of a police force not explain away
our result, but controlling for its introduction strengthens our finding.
5.3.2

Capital Punishment

As analyzed by Bindler and Hjalmarsson (2018a), this time period in British criminal law represents an
important transition between a Draconian style criminal justice system, where most felony crimes came with
the death penalty, to one where less-severe sanctions were used. They show that the jury’s convictions adjust
17 See

Davies (2002) for a further discussion of private policing in London.
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Table 4: Metro Police

coverage:
years:
Police x Treated

±40 years
[1796-1876]
[1]
0.0131
(0.0098)

Post x Treated

Year Fixed Effects
Crime Controls?
Controls?
R2
AIC
clusters
N

±40 years
[1796-1876]
[2]
-0.0150
(0.0104)
0.0317 ***
(0.0060)

Yes
Yes
Yes
0.529
54,754
81
135,363

Yes
Yes
Yes
0.529
54,744
81
135,363

Dependent variable is equal to one if the case resulted in a conviction. Controls include an indicator variable for being over
the age of 18, age missing, male, gender missing, trial using a London jury, and the trial using a Middlesex jury. We include
the number of defendants involved in the case. There are 32 crime indicator variables included. Standard errors presented
in parentheses are clustered at the crime by year level; *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% level of significance.

with the dropping of capital punishment. To that end, we estimate the following econometric model:
Convictionicy = γ1 P ostiy × T reatedicy × N otDeathEligibleicy + γ2 P ostiy × T reatedic
+ γ3 P ostiy × N otDeathEligibleicy + γ4 T reatedic × N otDeathEligibleicy

(3)

+ γ5 N otDeathEligibleicy + τiy + κic + Xicy γ + ϵicy .
This triple-difference specification identifies whether there is a systematic discrepancy between the effect
of the expansion to a right to counsel for felony crimes currently eligible for capital punishment and those
not. The indicator variable Not Death Eligible is equal to one if the crime came with the possibility of
capital punishment earlier in British courts, but at the time of the observation has had that maximum
possible sanction reduced. Since crimes that were never eligible for the death penalty are included in the
control group, the triple difference interaction captures whether the increase in the conviction rate varies by
the current severity of the crime’s sanction. Table 5 presents the estimation results.
Consistently, the triple-difference coefficient is statistically insignificant. Thus, there does not seem to be
a relationship between whether a felony crime is currently eligible for the death penalty and the impact of
the right to counsel on the jury’s willingness to convict.18
5.3.3

Is It the Solicitors?

The results up to this point can be thought of as an intent-to-treat analysis. That is, we evaluate how the
addition of a right to counsel affects convictions. We have not considered whether defendants actually hire
defense counsel after the Act’s implementation and whether our effect is limited to only those cases where
18 If,

alternatively, the difference-in-difference term in equation (1) is disaggregated into eligible and not eligible crimes, both
are positive, statistically significant at the 1% level, and relatively similar in size.
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Table 5: Triple Difference

Baseline
coverage:
years:
Post x Treated x Not Death Eligible

Crime Fixed Effects?
Year Fixed Effects
Controls?
R2
AIC
clusters
N

Alternative Time Windows

±40 years
[1796-1876]
[1]
-0.1150
(0.1328)

±30 years
[1806-1866]
[2]
-0.1250
(0.1411)

±50 years
[1786-1886]
[3]
-0.0409
(0.1522)

BH window
[1803-1871]
[4]
-0.1217
(0.1395)

Yes
Yes
Yes
0.529
54,735
81
135,363

Yes
Yes
Yes
0.569
34,040
61
117,299

Yes
Yes
Yes
0.475
81,995
98
153,046

Yes
Yes
Yes
0.544
44,677
69
125,315

Dependent variable is equal to one if the case resulted in a conviction (either through a trial conviction or a guilty plea).
Each specification differs in the time range considered. The full model presented in equation (3) is estimated, but only the
triple difference coefficient is presented. Standard errors clustered by crime are presented in parentheses; *** 1%, ** 5%, *
10% level of significance.

one is present. To expand our analysis, we introduce our indicator variable Counsel, which equals one if the
dictionary method discussed in Section 3 identifies the presence of a defense attorney, to the analysis. This
is the same variable used to identify the change in the defense counsel’s presence, as depicted previously in
Figure 1.
To explore the difference between cases where a defense attorney is present from cases where one cannot
be detected from the text of the transcript, we estimate the following econometric model:
Convictionicy = δ1 P ostiy × T reatedicy × Counselicy + δ2 P ostiy × T reatedic
+ δ3 P ostiy × Counselicy + δ4 T reatedic × Counselicy

(4)

+ δ5 Counselicy + τiy + κic + Xicy δ + ϵicy .
The triple difference coefficient, δ1 , identifies whether the treatment effect differs between cases where defense
counsel is used and cases where they do not seem to be present. Table 6 presents the estimation results.
The first column simply adds the indicator variable for the presence of defense counsel to the main
specification presented previously. The difference-in-difference coefficient is not affected by this variable’s
inclusion. Further, a negative and statistically significant coefficient on this indicator exists. This suggests
that either defense counsel is successful at avoiding convictions for their clients, or that there is selection in
which cases result in the defendant willing and able to hire an attorney.
The triple difference estimation presented in [2] produces an estimated effect (δb1 ) that is not statistically
different from zero. Thus, there is not a measurable difference between the heightened conviction rate
produced after the Act’s implementation between those cases where a defense counselor is utilized and those
cases where the defendant chooses not to hire an attorney. This result is important as it implies that it
is not necessarily a signal being sent to the jury that a defendant is willing/unwilling to hire professional
18

Table 6: Use of Defense Counsel

[1]
Post x Treated x Counsel

[2]
0.0249
(0.0199)

Post x Counsel

0.0659 ***
(0.0213)

Treated x Counsel

-0.0251
(0.0179)

Post x Treated

0.0261 ***
(0.0066)

0.0137
(0.0114)

Counsel

-0.0849 ***
(0.0051)

-0.0354 *
(0.0197)

Crime Fixed Effects?
Year Fixed Effects
Controls?
R2
AIC

Yes
Yes
Yes
0.536
53,111

Yes
Yes
Yes
0.536
52,986

Dependent variable is equal to one if the case resulted in a conviction (either through a trial conviction or a guilty plea).
Each specification differs in the time range considered. The full model presented in equation (3) is estimated, but only the
triple difference coefficient is presented. Standard errors clustered by crime are presented in parentheses; *** 1%, ** 5%, *
10% level of significance.

representation. Both cases with defense counsel and those without experience a heightened probability of
conviction. Thus, the introduction of the right to counsel represents an institutional change.
5.3.4

Dynamic Effects

Did the introduction to the full right to counsel have an immediate effect on the jury? The analysis up
to this point presumes that the change in the conviction rate is abrupt and constant over time. Here, we
consider the Act’s dynamic effects.
To do so, we divide the time into pentads. The pentads leading up to the Act’s implementation and the
pentads following are interacted with the treatment indicator variable replacing P ost × T reated in equation
(1). Figure 4 presents the point estimates and the 95% confidence intervals of the six pentads following
implementation (periods +1 through +6) and the six pentads prior to implementation (periods labeled -7
through -2).
As one can see, the effect occurs in the first pentad following the Act’s implementation and has a
relatively stable, positive effect for twenty years after the Act’s implementation. By five pentads after its
implementation, which corresponds to the 1856 to 1860 time period, the effect is essentially zero. That the
effect is relatively immediate and stable for two decades points to English juries having a notable correction
to their willingness to convict. While it is uncertain exactly why this effect eventually zeroes out, individuals
on juries 30 to 40 years after the Act’s implementation may simply not be aware of the unbalanced, lop-sided
19

Figure 4: Dynamic Effects

Each coefficient presented is a pentad interacted with the treatment indicator. The interactions are numbered with 0
representing the pentad immediately prior to the Act’s implementation (1831-1835), interacted with the treatment indicator.
All control variables specified in equation (1) are included but not depicted. An indicator variable for being after 1836 is
used, rather than separate year fixed effects, and an indicator variable for being a treated crime, rather than separate crime
controls, are included but not depicted. The results are estimated on the 1786 to 1886 time period, but extreme pentads
are not reported as by +5 the effect is statistically zero. Hence, the six pentads following the implementation (+1 through
+6) and the six pentads prior (-7 through -2) are shown. The 95% confidence intervals are shown for each.

20

Table 7: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects

[1]
0.0300 ***
(0.0064)

Post x Treated x Male

Post x Treated x Female

[2]

0.0033
(0.0075)

Post x Treated x Age less than 18

0.0378 ***
(0.0071)

Post x Treated x Age greater than 18

0.0223 ***
(0.0050)

Crime Fixed Effects
Year Fixed Effects
Controls
R2
AIC
N

Yes
Yes
Yes
0.529
54,702
135,363

Yes
Yes
Yes
0.155
7147
103,593

Dependent variable is equal to one if the case resulted in a conviction. Controls include an indicator variable for
being over the age of 18 (in [1] only), age missing (in [1] only), male (in [2] only), gender missing (in [2] only),
trial using a London jury, and the trial using a Middlesex jury. We include the number of defendants involved in
the case. There are 32 crime indicator variables included. Standard errors presented in parentheses are clustered
at the crime by year level; *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% level of significance.

nature of trials prior to the creation of the right to counsel and may no longer be correcting for the improved
professionalization.
Also, as one can see, the pentads leading up to the Act’s implementation consistently include zero in the
95% confidence interval. This is further evidence supporting the finding of parallel trends and the causal
interpretation of the result.
The possible exception is the pentad just prior to the Act’s implementation (Pentad −1). The slight
reduction in the conviction rate for the (soon-to-be) treated crimes is modest. Further, the coefficient has
the opposite sign as the estimated treatment effect. Thus, even if it was taken to suggest that the treated
crimes were beginning to diverge from the controls, this effect would bias our results towards zero and we
would be underestimating the right to counsel’s effect.
5.3.5

Heterogeneous Treatment Effects

Past research on trials at the Old Bailey, as mentioned, focused on gender and age of the defendant. Here, we
explore whether the right to counsel had heterogeneous treatment effects based on the demographic factors.
For each, we simply disaggregate the difference-in-difference coefficient. Table 7 provides the results.
The increased conviction rate is concentrated in male defendants. Similar-sized effects, though, are
experienced by the young and old alike.
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Figure 5: Before and After the 1836 Act
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Each column depicts the proportion of observations where a defense counsel is present in the transcript of the trial. The
light gray columns are the proportion in the years prior to the Act’s implementation, while the dark gray columns are for
the years where the Act is in place. The 95% confidence intervals are depicted as well.

6

Text Analysis

We now turn to an analysis of the transcripts of the Old Bailey criminal trials. We use a popular topic
modeling method in text analysis. The objective is to uncover the “themes”/“topics” covered within each
trial. Our goal is to provide evidence of whether the topics covered during the courtroom trials adjusted
after defense counsel was able to fully participate in criminal trials. This can shed light on the possible
mechanism behind our result.
First, as previously described, we record the prevalence of defense counsel by identifying the existence of
related keywords in the text depicted in Figure 1 previously. We did this for the full data set. Expanding
this work, we partition the data set by the crime committed and identify which crimes exhibit the most
dramatic increases in the use of defense counsel. Doing so, four crimes record clear, measurable increases:
fraud, pickpocketing, theft19 , and animal theft. Figure 5 illustrates.
The jumps are substantial for each ranging from a 21% increase (animal theft) to a 123% increase (fraud)
in the measured rate of defense counsel presence. The appendix provides the time series for each of these
four crimes as well. Each exhibits an upward trend after 1836 with a rather flat trend prior. Hence, we
will focus on the four crimes that are shown in Figure 5 to exhibit large changes in the presence of defense
counsel and investigate the trial transcript’s text for each subset. While topic modeling methods are subject
to interpretation, we use it to provide depth to the causal analysis already conducted.
19 Specifically,

the crime “theft from place”, which is distinct from petty larceny, simple larceny, grand larceny, and “stealing

from master”.
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6.1

Latent Dirichlet Allocation

Latent Dirichlet Allocation (hereafter LDA) is a computational linguistic algorithm (Blei, Ng, and Jordan,
2003). It allows for the creation of communication measures based on topic models, which is a class of
machine learning algorithms for natural language processing.
LDA allows for automatic clustering of any kind of textual documents into a user chosen number of
themes, known as topics. It uses a probabilistic model of text data. The logic is that when authors write
about a particular topic, they tend to use the same words. Hence, in texts about the same topic, similar words
tend to co-occur. LDA describes each topic as a probability distribution over words, and each document as
a probability distribution over topics.
Formally, each document d in a set of documents D is described as a probabilistic mixture of T topics.
A document topic vector, θd , describes the document. Rather,
  

θ1
P (t = 1|d = 1) · · · P (t = T |d = 1)
  

..
..
..
θ =  ...  = 
.
.
.
.
θD

P (t = 1|d = D)

...

(5)

P (t = T |d = D)

Here, P (t|d) is the probability weight put on topic t within document d. Each topic t in the set of topics T
is described by a probability distribution over the vocabulary of V words present in all documents. Rather,


P (w = 1|t = 1) · · · P (w = 1|t = T )
 

..
..
..
(6)
ϕ = ϕ1 · · · ϕT = 
.
.
.
.
P (w = V |t = 1) ... P (w = V |t = T )
Here, P (w|t) is the probability weight put on word w in topic t.
With this, the presumption of LDA is that a document is written according to the following process.
First, each topic’s distribution over words in the vocabulary is drawn according to the Dirichlet distribution
function; ϕ ∼ Dir(β). For each document in the corpus each’s mixture of topics is drawn again according
to the Dirichlet distribution; θd ∼ Dir(α). Thus, the researcher must only select the number of topics to
organize the documents into, T , and the two hyperparameters, α and β. The likelihood of the corpus is


Nd X
D
Y
Y
P (zd,n |θd )P (wd,n |zd,n , ϕ) .
P (θd |α) 
(7)
d=1

n=1 zd,n

Gibbs sampling is used to estimate the conditional probabilities that best explain the corpus of documents.20
From this process, LDA calculates for each document the probability it falls within each topic. This
probability distribution classifies the document as it measures the mixture of topics contained within.
LDA does not require the researcher’s pre-knowledge or rely on his/her discretion when it comes to
knowing which words to search for within the text. It provides a way of uncovering hidden themes in
text without having to link themes to particular word lists prior to estimation. LDA is valuable when the
researcher does not know a priori which words are the important ones to track. This allows one to avoid
subjective judgments and to account for context.
20 The

variable zd,n records the word’s position in the document.
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The use of LDA in economics is rather new. One notable exception is the work of Hansen, McMahon, and
Prat (2018) who evaluates Federal Open Market Committee transcripts. They use the variation in topics
discussed, assessed using LDA, as the dependent variable to appreciate how experience on the FOMC and
transparency interact.21 Another application is Larsen and Thorsrud (2019) who use LDA to model topics
covered in a Norwegian business newspaper and use the prevalence of the topics in a time series analysis
of a measurement of asset prices. McCannon (2020) uses it to evaluate descriptions of wine adding the
probability weights created by the LDA process as explanatory variables in a hedonic price regresssion.22
Outside of economics, LDA is popular. It has been used effectively in related fields such as political
science. Grimmer (2010) and Quinn et al. (2010) use LDA to analyze press releases from U.S. Senators. It
has been used in marketing to evaluate online discussions of products (Tirunillai and Tellis, 2014), customer
reviews in tourism management (Guo, Barnes, and Jia, 2017), and public discourse during the COVID-19
pandemic (Xue et al., 2020). In finance it has also proven to be useful identifying trends in 10-K disclosures (Dyer, Lang, and Stice-Lawrence, 2017) and gauging investor complaints to the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau (Bastani, Namavari, and Shaffer, 2019).
As a baseline analysis, separately for each of the four crimes we organize the trial transcripts into ten
topics (T = 10). As with the main result previously identified, we consider trials that occurred in the
80-year window centered on the Act’s implementation. Our supplemental appendix provides details on
the data cleaning process. For example, common stopwords (such as “and” and “the”) are eliminated, as
is punctuation, capitalization, numbers, and proper names. LDA is conducted for each subsample. As
described, this process produces a probability distribution over the ten topics for each observation. In
addition, the probability distribution over words in the vocabulary is estimated for each topic.

6.2

Analysis

To illustrate the output, consider one topic, which for convenience we label as Topic 1, created within the
transcripts of trials involving those accused of fraud. Across the 2328 fraud trials between 1796 and 1876
the probability weight put on Topic 1 has a mean of 0.061 with a standard deviation of 0.166. Figure 6
represents the time series of Topic 1’s prevalence. In Figure 6, for illustration purposes, we collapse the data
to an annual data set depicting each year’s mean and 95% confidence intervals.
As one can see, the prevalence of Topic 1 is both flat and essentially zero into the 1850s. Only after 1850
does the confidence interval begin to lie above zero. Exploring which words dominate this topic, Table 8
lists selected words that have a large probability of arising in a document that involves Topic 1.23 In Table
8 we rank the words according to their probabilities derived from the LDA estimation.
Clearly, words related to mail show up as being prominent in Topic 1. Looking at the other nine topics,
these words are less likely to arise in trials not involving this topic. Topic 1 can be relabeled as Mail Fraud.
21 Edison

and Carcel (2021) also analyzes FOMC texts using LDA.
Grajzl and Murrell (2021) for an interesting text analysis of British common law and Nowak and Smith (2017) for a
text analysis of home listings. These papers, while related, use a different but similar text analysis method.
23 We do not report common words such as “said” and “man” which arise with a large probability in most topics.
22 See

24

Figure 6: Topic 1 (Mail Fraud) over Time

The probability weight put on this topic (from the LDA process) for each observation is collapsed to the annual level. The
mean is depicted with the 95% confidence interval. Only those observations where fraud is the crime are considered for the
80-year window; 1796 to 1876.

Table 8: Differentiating Words in Fraud: Mail

Fraud: Mail

Other 9 Topics

word
letter
street
name
received
letters
office
sent
signed
road
wrote
writing
address
place
paper

word rank
2
3
4
5
8
9
13
14
19
26
27
37
38
40

mean
175.4
212.4
29.3
22.1
308.7
120.2
38.7
187.1
326.3
180.9
101.6
334.7
98.1
97.4

median
110
102
17
17
338
81
35
105
358
163
97
501
76
83

average rank

17.5

110.5

149.5

The first column provides the ranking of the word in the list of words associated with Topic 1. The second and third
columns consider the word rankings in the other nine topics reporting the mean and median, respectively. The final row
provides the average rank for the selected words in Topic 1 and the average of the averages and medians for the other nine
topics. When a word does not arise in the top 500 words for a particular topic, then it receives a ranking of 501.
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Mail-related fraud is a potential source for fraud. Investigating British history, the first postage stamp was
introduced in Great Britain in 1840. Previously, mail was paid for by the recipient and the fee was a function
of the distance traveled, along with its weight. Not too infrequently, then, the recipient rejected the delivery.
To simplify the mail service and expand its use in the population, the pre-paid stamp was introduced. It had
a flat fee (regardless of distance traveled) below previous postal rates. This presumably reduced rejection
rates allowing for economies of scale to bring down the mail’s average cost. As a consequence, mailing become
common and we would expect that mail-related fraud became more prevalent. LDA is able to detect the
rise of mail fraud in the 1850s, 60s, and 70s.24 While unrelated to the introduction of the right to counsel,
it does demonstrate validity to the analysis method.
Setting aside mail fraud, it turns out that one topic within each set of ten topics consistently experiences
a noticeable increase in prevalence, and this change coincides approximately with the introduction to the
right to counsel in 1836. We refer to these topics as Timing. Table 9 provides the selected words that
dominate this topic for each of the four crimes.
For each crime words related to the timing of events are prominent. Thus, we call these topics Timing.
For each crime, the LDA estimation identifies timing-related words as a distinct topic. Figure 7 depicts the
time series of each.
For each of the four crime categories, the selected Timing topic visually exhibits a change in the time
trend. That is, the prevalence of that particular topic seems rather flat but then begins a gradual escalation. This escalation begins near the 1836 date − the date of the Act’s implementation. There are not
any noticeable changes in the prevalence of any other topic near 1836. The appendix provides their time
series. Once again, this suggests that the increased prevalence of defense attorneys coincides with testimony
that highlights the exact timing of events which we interpret as an effect of the professionalization of the
courtroom.
On the other hand, if timing-related words become more frequent in the treated crimes after the Act is
implemented, then it should also be the case that in the control crimes a topic with timing-related words
should not change with the Act’s implementation. To study this, we conduct the LDA estimation on the
subset of trials that fall within the control category. Doing this, we once again find one topic that is related
to the timing of events.25 Figure 8 presents the time series of this topic in the trial transcripts of the control
crimes.
Clearly, the prevalence is quite flat. A difference-in-means t-test comparing those control crimes prior to
1836 to those after generates a statistically insignificant difference. Therefore, while timing-related testimony
becomes more prevalent in the treated, felony cases it shows no change in the control crimes.
Rather than rely on visual evaluation, we ask whether we can find statistically significant evidence that
24 In fact, the word “post” is ranked 74 and “post-office” is ranked 185 in Mail Fraud. The latter is not even in the top 500
for any of the other nine topics.
25 We provide the selected list of differentiating words and their prevalence in the other nine topics in the supplemental
appendix.
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Table 9: Timing Across Crimes

Fraud
word

rank

time
day
never
last
afterwards
date
months
since
now
year
present
remember
days
years
times
always

2
17
18
41
50
51
52
53
54
56
58
75
104
118
133
134

avg rank

63.5
Theft

Pickpocketing
avg rank
(other 9)
11.9
23.4
15.3
39.78
44.6
342.8
56.1
101.9
98.3
244.7
139.4
192.1
100.9
90.9
127.4
173.3

word

rank

o’clock
night
time
morning
never
day
minutes
months
afterwards
years
evening
half-past
since
hour

5
15
16
17
23
30
31
33
34
41
47
48
57
87

avg rank
(other 9)
17.2
102.0
81.2
133.3
69.4
115.0
61.2
121.4
117.3
63.1
75.7
146.7
315.0
166.1

112.7

avg rank
34.6
113.2
Animal Theft
word

rank

o’clock
day
morning
time
afterwards
minutes
night
years
evening
months
half-past
hour

8
11
13
22
30
31
40
41
45
49
51
64

avg rank
(other 9)
9.8
30.7
11.9
41.7
47.2
143.8
27.0
50.7
58.2
103.0
160.4
145.4

avg rank

33.8

69.1

word

rank

o’clock
time
day
never
morning
minutes
evening
years
afterwards
night
hour
half-past
months
clock
afternoon

6
8
14
15
16
20
31
36
37
39
51
58
60
70
88

avg rank
(other 9)
85.3
57.6
72.8
60.7
29.2
169.1
82.4
47.3
91.0
78.4
156.0
225.3
86.6
432.8
216.0

avg rank

36.6

126.0

In each panel, the first column provides the ranking of the word in the list of words associated with Timing. The second
column provides the average of the word ranking in the other nine topics. The final row provides the average rank for the
selected words in both Timing and the average of the averages for the other nine topics. When a word is not in a topic’s
top 500 words, it is assigned a ranking of 501.
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Figure 7: Timing over Time

(a) Fraud

(b) Pickpocketing

(c) Theft

(d) Animal Theft

The probability weights put on these topics (from the LDA process) for each observation are collapsed to the annual level.
The means are depicted with the 95% confidence intervals. Only those observations where fraud is the crime are considered
for the 80-year window; 1796 to 1876.

Figure 8: Timing in Misdemeanor Cases

The probability weights put on this topic (from the LDA process) for each observation are collapsed to the annual level.
The mean is depicted with the 95% confidence interval. Only those observations for the 80-year window (1796 to 1876) is
considered.
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Table 10: Break in Time Trends for Timing

crime:

Fraud
[1]
0.00777
(1.30434)

Pickpocketing
[2]
-1.67518 *** ***
(0.31958)

Theft
[3]
-3.09613 ***
(0.39133)

Animal Theft
[4]
-3.37149 ***
(0.84928)

Control Crimes
[5]
-0.04080
(1.55630)

Post (ζb1 )

-5.28525 ***
(1.41390)

-1.58490 ***
(0.43390)

-2.26303 ***
(0.67407)

-7.47237 ***
(1.40535)

-1.25927
(1.65438)

Year (ζb2 )

0.00001
(0.00072)

0.00093 ***
(0.00081)

0.00173 ***
(0.67407)

0.00188 ***
(1.40535)

0.00004
(0.00085)

Post x Year (ζb3 )

0.00287 ***
(0.00077)

0.01107 ***
(0.00024)

0.00086 ***
(0.00037)

0.00406 ***
(0.00076)

0.00068
(0.00091)

R2
F
N

0.0477
38.8 ***
2328

0.0383
144.1 ***
10,864

0.0405
118.1 ***
8396

0.0968
76.4 ***
2141

0.0035
2.1 *
1855

constant (ζb0 )

Dependent variable is the probability weight put on that particular topic. Standard errors presented in parentheses; ***
1%, ** 5%, * 10% level of significance.

the time trend changes course after 1836. To that end, for each topic we estimate the following model:
T opiciy = ζ0 + ζ1 P ostiy + ζ2 Y eariy + ζ3 P ostiy × Y eariy + ϵiy .

(8)

The dependent variable is the probability weight put on the topic for observation i, which arose in year y.
The constant ζ0 is the intercept, while ζ2 captures the time trend for the topic’s prevalence prior to the
Act’s implementation. The variable Y eariy is a linear time trend where every observation in year y takes
the value equal to that year. The indicator variable P ostiy is equal to one if y > 1836. Hence, ζ1 allows for
a jump at the implementation of the right to counsel and ζ3 measures how (and whether) the time trend
adjusts when defense counsel is fully introduced into criminal trials at the Old Bailey.
If the Act causes a break at 1836 shifting up the presence of the topic (as a level-effect), then ζb1 will be
positive and large but ζb3 will be expected to be equal to zero. If, on the other hand, the effect of the Act
grows gradually over time then ζb3 will be positive. Table 10 presents the results for each of the four crime
category subsamples.
Each topic exhibits a slow increase in its prevalence prior to the Act’s implementation, followed by a sharp
upward rotation in the slope. The results indicate that there was a gradual effect of the Act on the criminal
trials at the Old Bailey, as measured by the text of the trial transcripts.26 The final column considers the
control crimes and illustrates no change in the time trend around the time of the Act’s implementation.
While not presented here, we replicate our text analysis using twenty topics (T = 20). Once again, one
topic selects timing-related words in each crime subsample, and again experiences an increase in prevalence
26 The large, negative coefficients on P ost are not a concern as they are an artifact of the units of measurement for the time
trend. The value of Y ear comes from the interval [1796, 1876]. Thus, as an example, consider Animal Theft, which has a large
and negative coefficient on P ost. Moving from the year 1836 to 1839 brings the fitted value back up to its previous level.
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after 1836. Avoiding redundancy, we do not present the extra results here. In addition, we replicate the
structural break estimation for the other nine topics within each of the four crime types. Few other topics
even have a positive rotation in the time period after 1836.

7

Conclusion

We provide the first causal identification of the impact of the introduction to the right to counsel on criminal
trials. This is done by taking advantage of a unique situation in 1800s British courts. Recognizing that
minor offenses had a history of allowing defense counsel but felonies did not, we employ a difference-indifference estimation strategy to identify the impact of the introduction of the right to counsel for felony
crimes. We show that conviction rates increased. We interpret this result as suggesting that when jurors feel
that the criminal proceedings are unfairly stacked against the defendant, they are unwilling to convict. By
professionalizing the courtroom, jurors no longer have to correct for the imbalance and convictions increase.27
We employ a popular topic modeling approach to text analysis to provide some suggestive information
on how the trial’s change. Investigating four crimes that are recognized to have substantial increases in the
prevalence of defense counsel after the Act’s implementation, we show that words related to the timing of
events becomes a more important part of the trial’s testimony.
One potential implication to modern criminal justice institutions could be the issue of the quality of
publicly-provided defense counsel. While indigent defense is commonly provided to those who lack financial
resources, strong evidence points to worse outcomes arising by those who cannot pay for their own attorney.
Further, full-time, salaried public defenders outperform attorneys who are appointed at a case-by-case basis.
Our results may suggest that improving the quality of the defense counsel may lead to increased convictions.
The normative implication of this is unclear as one cannot predict whether these increased convictions came
with heightened or mitigated rates of type I errors and, relatedly, whether it enhances the deterrent effect.
We use one popular topic modeling approach known as Latent Dirichlet Allocation to analyze the text.
It is by no means the only computational linguistic algorithm that can be used. Future researchers may be
able to learn more about the impact of the introduction to the right to counsel by applying other methods.
Similarly, LDA at most provides suggestive evidence as the meaning of the topics are open to interpretation.
Nevertheless, we feel that applying these techniques complements the more-formal econometric analysis by
providing information on the underlying mechanism.
Our investigation is best thought of as an intent-to-treat analysis as we explore how the introduction to
the right to counsel affects the conviction rate, regardless of whether the defendant hired an attorney or not.
Along with only having a noisy measurement of the use of a defense counsel, there is no reason to believe
that the introduction of the right to counsel only affects those cases where one is used.
A challenge to all empirical investigations is external validity. We do not know, for example, if modern
27 This

result was anticipated by the historian David Bentley. In his discussion of the Prisoners’ Counsel Act Bentley (2003)
predicted that “[r]ather than leading to wrongful acquittals, the Bill would be likely to result in more convictions, for juries
would no longer acquit out of sympathy excited by the prisoner’s inability to defend himself” (Bentley 2003; p. 108).
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jurors respond similarly to those serving in the 18th and 19th century in London. Also, the investigation
explores procedures in a common law country. It is unclear how the right to counsel affects outcomes in civil
law systems. Our work, though, makes a unique contribution to the small, growing literature investigating
how the incentives of legal actors affect criminal justice outcomes.
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9

Appendix

The time series for the presence of defense counsel in the four selected crimes are presented in Figure 9. The
time series for the other topics not presented in the main body, for each of the four crimes, are provided in
Figures 10, 11, 12, 13.
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Figure 9: Defense Counsel Presence

(a) Fraud

(b) Pickpocketing

(c) Theft

(d) Animal Theft
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Figure 10: Fraud Topics Over Time

(a) Topic 1

(b) Topic 2

(c) Topic 3

(d) Topic 4

(e) Topic 7

(f) Topic 8

(g) Topic 9

(h) Topic 10

The topic numbered “Topic 5” is Timing and “Topic 6” is Mail Fraud. They are presented in the text.
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Figure 11: Pickpocketing Topics Over Time

(a) Topic 1

(b) Topic 2

(c) Topic 3

(d) Topic 4

(e) Topic 6

(f) Topic 7

(g) Topic 8

(h) Topic 9

(i) Topic 10

The topic numbered “Topic 5”, Timing, is presented in the text.
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Figure 12: Theft Topics Over Time

(a) Topic 1

(b) Topic 2

(c) Topic 4

(d) Topic 5

(e) Topic 6

(f) Topic 7

(g) Topic 8

(h) Topic 9

(i) Topic 10

The topic numbered “Topic 3”, Timing, is presented in the text.
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Figure 13: Animal Theft Topics Over Time

(a) Topic 2

(b) Topic 3

(c) Topic 4

(d) Topic 5

(e) Topic 6

(f) Topic 7

(g) Topic 8

(h) Topic 9

(i) Topic 10

The topic numbered “Topic 1”, Timing, is presented in the text.

41

